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I．　Im1；rOd116tiOm
　　Forエnany　of　environmental　resources，no　prices　are　attached　to　thei土
services　because　no　one　owns　them　as　private　propertyεmd　hence
econo㎜ic　decision　makers　are　not　receiving也e　correct　signa1s　concer－
ning　the　use　of　these　resources．In　other　words，since　environmental
services　do　not　pass　through皿arkets，Inarkets　fai1to　attach　prices　to
them　and　thus　fai1to　lead　their　auocation　to　the　best　uses．Without
the　apProPriate　payments　or　prices，there　are　no　incentives　for　the
decision　makers　to　take　the　appropriate　action．　Let　us　consider，for
examp1e，the　waste　repository　service　of　the　river．Because　the　price
of　this　service　is　zero　to　dischargers，they　wi11expand　its　use　to　the
point　where　the　marginal∀alue　of　the　service　is　zero　to　them，even
though　the　socia1㎜argina1cost㎜ay　greatly　exceed　zero．As　a　conse－
quence，their　use　of　the　river　for　wastes　discharge　wi11be　excessive．
＊I　wou1d1ike　to　express　my　gratitude　to　the　Schoo1ofCom血erce　at　Waseda
University　which　gave　me　a　valuable　oppo竹unity　of　studying　at　the　University
of　Mimesota　and　to　Professors0．H．Brow皿1ee　and　Edward　Foster　for　their
suggestions　in　the　con1pletion　of　this　paper・
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　　To　put　it　d狙erently，迂1㎜extema1砒seconomy　is　present，socia1costs
exce剣pdvate　co§ts．　But　shce皿aヱkets　acco1mt　for　private　costs　only，
atthe　m班ketequilibri㎜the　socia1margina1cost　is　greater　than　the
socia1marginal　va1ue．Therefore，competitive　markets　fai1to　produce
optima1al1ocation　of　resources　in　t－at　the　socia1　ma工9ina1cost　is　not
equaI　to　the　socia1marginal　YaIue，The　m趾ket　system　wi111ead　to
o▽emse　of　resources　in　the　case　of　extemal　diseconomies．So血e　inter－
ference　with　the　m虹ket　mechanism　is　necessary　to　correct　the　mis－
a11ocation　of　environmental　resources　and　to　secure　optima1alIocation，
　　Among　possible　policy　measures　for　this　p岨pose，we　wi1l　analyze　and
eVa1uate　fOur　alternatiVe　StrategieS　fOr　COntrOuing　eXternalitieS，　Say，
water　ponution：（1）the　acceptabi肚y　criterion　approach，（2）the　envi－
ronmenta1standards　and　pricing　apPl＝oach，（3）the“tax　po1luters　only”
apProach，　and　（4）　the　“tax　pol1uters　and　quality・enjoyers”　apProach．
In　the　process　of　ana1ysis　we　wouId1ike　to　make　clear　the　theoretical
もackgromds　and　issues　of　these　strategies．　The　evaluation　a二na　co血一
parison　wi1l　main1y　be　concemed　with　the　al1ocationa1aspects　of　the
policy　measures，except　for　some　considerations　on　the　practical　aspects
of　them．The　distributional　consequences　of　these㎜easuτes　wi11not
be　exp1icitly　taken　into　account　in　this　paper．
II．　T1le　A6cep曲bi1ity　Criterio皿ApProach
　　To　begh　with，we　sha1l　consider　the　“acceptability　criterion　ap－
proach”for　control11I1g　extema1ユtles．In　an　ldealエzed　economy　where
poHcy　makers　haYe　full　know1edge　of　indi▽idual　demand　fmcti㎝s，the
production　fmctions　for丘rms　aエ1d　the　industry，and　extemal　cost
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fmctions，they　could　compute㎝d　specify　the　P砒eto　optima11evels　of
the　relevant　activities　and　assign　to　ea．ch　economic　agent　a　determinate
share　in　the　targeted1eve1of　the　activities（Buch…maln－丁汕1ock［4］）．
Therefore，by　setting　the　s此mdards　of　en▽ironmenta1qua1ity　to　the
activity1eve1which　corresponds　to　the　Pareto　optima1situation，a二n
ef日cient　a11ocation　of　resources　would　be　insured　in　this　case．
　　In　m㎝y　cases　of　extema1diseconomies，howeYer，the　number　of
activities　invo1ved　and　the　number　of　persons　a伍ected　by　them肌e　so
great，in　addition　to　the　intangib1e　nature　of工nany　conseque皿ces，　that
it　is　usual1y　di伍cu1t　to　obtain　a　reasonable　estimate　of　the　extemaI
costs．For　these　situations　there　is　an　a1temative　way　which　could　be
easi1y　apP1ied　to　the　real　problem　of　externa1ities，　Simp1y　speaking，it
invo1ves　the　selection　of　a　set　of　somewhat㎝bitrary　standards　for　an
a㏄eptable　environmenta1quality　with　ines　or　other　crimim1penalties
for　those　who　violate　them．　These　standards　represent　the　decision
maker’s　subjective　evaluation　of　the　minimum　environmentaI　standards
Ewir㎝m㎝ta！q口a肚y
Standard
T＾ Margina1abate㎜㎝tCOSt
O　　　　　　　　　Q‘
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Fi即re1
Discharges　of　wastes
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that　must　be血et　in　order　to　achieve　a　reasonab1e　quality　of雌e．
Whether　made　on　technica1or　po1itica1gromds，a　minimm　standard
is　equivalent　to　a　vertical　tota1damage　function　at　that　point．That　is
to　say，po1lution　up　to　the　leve1of　the　s値mdard，say，Q＊h　Figuエe1，
is　imp1icit1y　assumed　to　have　m　cost；discharges　resulthg　in　po11ution
above　that　leve1are　assumed　to　haYe　in舳ite　costs．　The　minimum
st㎝dards　imp1y　that　the　discharges　of　wastes　must　be　kept　at　or
below　Q＊．ω
　　It　is　easy　to　see　that　the　minimum　standards　procedure　wil1nOt　in
genera1Iead　to　the　optimal　level　of　the　activities．First　of　al1，since　a
minimu血standard　is　se1ected　more　or　less　arbitrarily，it　does　not
generauy　correspond　to　the　optima11eve1…md　hence　even　when　the
sセmdard　is正口et，the　ei五cient　situation　is　not　1ike1y　to　occur．　Second，
now　suppose　that　the　minimum　standard　happens　to　be　identica1to　the
Paretooptima11evel．Wherethere　ismorethanonedischarger，thepolicy
makers㎜ust　then　a11ocate　a　total　a11owab1e　quantity　of　residuals　discha－
rge　among　polluters　on　some　basis．In　the　absence　of　cost　information，
the　tota1discharge　permits　are　like1y　to　be　al1ocated　among丘rms　in　an
ine揃cient　and　perhaps　quite　inequitab1e　way　resulting　in　higher　than
necessary　tota1abatement　costs，　The　condition　for　minimum　total
costs＿the　marginal　abatement　costs　of　all　dischargers　are　to　be　equalized
at　the　allowable　discharge1evels－wil1be　achieved　on1y　by　chance．
　　Moreo∀er，a　few　remarks　must　be　made　on　this　acceptability　criterion
approach．First，according　to　Baumo1－0ates［2］，it　wou1d　seem　that
mte岬ention　in　the　form　of　acceptabl11ty　standards　can　be　ut111zed　w1th
　　（1〕See　Free血an　III・Havema口・Kneese［6］，i口particular，chapter5・
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any　degree　of　conidence　on1y　where　there1s　clear　reason　to　be11eve
that　the　existi口g　situation　imposes　a　high　level　of　social　costs　and　that
these　costs　can　be　signiicantly　reduced　by　feasible　decreases　in　the
le∀els　of　certain　externality－generating　activities．　If　the　relationship
between　socia1welfare　and　the　1evel　of　the　extema1ity－generating
act1wty1s　not　monotonlcally　decreasmg，the　changes　result1ng　from　the
i皿position　of　an　acceptabiIity　standard　may　lead　to　a　reduction　in　we1－
fare．Second，once　dischargers　have　comp1ied　with　the　standards，they
have　no　further　incentive　to　take　steps　to　cut　back　residuals　Hows　and
to　improve　the　quaIity　of　the　wastes．Third，depending　on　the　cost　of
compliance　and　the　ines　or　penalties　associated　with　noncomp1iance，
and　a1so　the　probabi1ity　of　violation　being　detected，dischargers　may丘nd
it　adv㎝tageous　not　to　comply　with　the　standardsεmd　to　pay　the丘nes
or　the　judicial　cost　on　the　criminal　penalties．
III．The　Emvho皿memtal　Prici皿g　aM　Sta皿d肛ds　ApPmach
　　But，if　the　price　system　is　incorporated　in　the　acceptability　criterion
procedure，each　pol1uterwou1dbegiven　an　economicincenti∀etoreducethe
とmount　of　e舖uent　he　emits　aI1d　to　improve　the　quality　of　the　discharge．
This　is　just　an　idea　behind　the“environmental　pricing　and　standards
approach”．It　consists　of　the　setting　of　somewhat　arbitrary　standards
of　environ皿enta1quality　and　then　the　imposition　of　charges　on　waste
emissions　su冊cient　to　attain　these　standards．②Let　us　retum　to　Figure
（2〕Brie町speaking，this　apProach　proposed　in　Baumo1こOates　［2コmay　be
　interpreted　as　a　mixture　of　the　acceptabi肚yαづterion　approach　stated　above
　and　the　e触uent　taxes　which　will　be　shortly　exami皿ed　in　the　next　section．
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1h　wllich　the　veIt1α汕sセ㎜dard　now　replaces　the　m孤g㎜al　dal㎜age
curve．　If　the　tota1abatement　cost　function　is　known，the　apPropriate
charge　is　one　that　is　equa1to　工na工ginal　abate－nent　cost　at　the　point
w11ere　that　cuηe　intersects血e　staI1daエーd．Thus，比e　charge　is　equa1
to＄T＊per㎜it　of　the　residua1s　discharge　and　this　procedure　can　at
工east　o丘er　some　assur…㎜ce　of　reducbg　the1evel　of　e舐uent　discharges．
　　Whi1e　such　an　approach　c1ear1y　wi11not　in　generaI　produce　a　P孤eto
opti㎜a1au㏄ation　of　reso岨ces，it　has　been　shown　to　haYe　some　practica1
advantages　and　some　i㎜portant　optimality　properties．
　　The　advantages　of　the　pricing　a口d　standards　approach　（relative　to
也e　Pigouvian　tax－subsidy　procedure－3】）Iies　in　its　workability　because　it
requires　far1ess　information　for　its　imp1ementation．Moreover，it　utilizes
globa1血eas岨es　and　avoids　dire砒controls　with　a11of　their　heavy
administratiYe　costs　and　their　distortions　of　consumer　choice　and　i口ef・
丘ciencies．　It　need　not　add　to　the　丘nanc1al　burdens　of　the　state　and
loca1govemments．In　addition，the　ad二minis此ative　procedures＿the　selec－
tion　of　standards　and　the　use　of丘sca1incentives　to　achie▽e　these　stan・
dards＿are　quite　si血ilar　to　those　used　in　a　n㎜lber　of　economic　policy
measures　such　as　the　iiscal　and　monetary　policy．This　suggests　that
public　administrators　are　fa二miliar　with　this　sort　of　generaI　approach．
　　One1mportant　optma11ty　property　of　the　pr1cmg　and　sta皿dards
proced岨e　is砒at　it　is　the　least－cost　method　to　realize　these　stand酊ds．
Let　us　state　precisely　this　prope前y：Giマen　any▽ector　of五nal　outputs
byth・pl・nt・，・t・・p・・mit・f・舳・nt・・飼・i・・tt…d…th・・・…u
（3）The　Pigouvian　procedure　for　controlling　exte胴alities　is　a　m出皿issue
　　discussed　｛n　detai1afteτthis　section．
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poIIution　leveI　to　the　des辻ed　one　WiiI　achieve　this　decrease　at　minむn皿m
COSt　tO　SOCiety・一・、
　　Now　we　shall　brieiy　show　a　forma1proof　of　this　proposition　which
is　provided　in　the　apPendix　of［2コ．
∫妙1．We　sha11derive　the丘rst－order　conditions　for　the　minim虹ti㎝
of　the　cost　of　a　speciied　overa11reduction　in　the　e冊uent　wastes．Let
狛田be　the　quantity　of　input6used　by　p1ant砂（｛＝1，…，〃三砂＝1，…　，　刎）。
z”be　the　quantity　of　waste　it　discharges，伽be　its　output1eveI，五（κ1剋，＿，
κ旭螂、　2”，ツ田）＝O　be　its　production　function，か　be　the　price　of　iI1put　6，
and尾be　the　desired　level　ofΣ為．Then　the　prob1em　is　to　determine
the　va1ue　of　the挑and～s　that　minimize　input　cost　c＝ΣΣか伽
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　｛　冊
subject　to　the　output　constraints伽≡ツ葦＝constant（砂…1，．．．，刎）and　the
6onstraint　on　the　total　output　of　po11utantsΣ2也昌后．　Forming　the
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　冊
Lagrange　function，
　　　　工＝ΣΣか蛎佃十Σλ旭力（均也，…，κ冊他，為，伽）十λ（Σ2田一尾）十Σμ螂（ツ也一バ），
　　　　　　　也　o　　　　　　　　句　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　田　　　　　　　　　”
we　obtah　the　irst－order　conditions：
　　　　λ刊砺十1＝0　　　（。≡1，．．，刎）
　　　　　　∂2田
州也∂篶田一・ （〃＝1，…，刎バ＝1，…，〃）
　　　ツ也一功＝O　　　　　（〃＝1，…，刎）
The　second－order　condlt1ons　are　assumed　to　be　satis丘ed
∫ま砂2．Next　we　sha11show　that血e　independent　dec1sions　of　cost－
minimizing丘rms　subject　to　the　apPropriate　mit　tax　on　waste　emissions
will，in　fact，satisfy　the　irst－order　conditions　for　o∀era11cost　mini－
m㎞tion．The　problem　of　fm砂here　is　to　minimize6＝柘肥十Σあ伽
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subject　to伽；ツ害一　Form　the　function，
　　　G＝勉十Σ伽κ加十ん九（”1螂，…，”刎，為，伽）十μ（ツ価一ツ苫）．
Then　the五rst・order　conditions　wi11be
　　　チ。2藺弘；0
　　　　　　　　∂2咄
州佃∂篶切一・
　　　ツ把一ツま＝O．
It　is　seen　that　these　conditions　are　the　same　as　those　derived　in　Step
1，provided　that彦is　set　equal　toλ，the　shadow　price　of　the　pol1ution
constraint．Therefore，if　we　impose　an　e固uent　tax　that　achieves　the
des止ed　reduction　in　the　tota1emission　of　discharges，we　have　proved
that　this　reduction　will　satisfy　the　necessary　conditions　for　the　minim－
ization　of　the　o▽erall　cost　to　society．
IY．　The　E価uent　Taxes　Om　PO1111ters
　　The　e価uent　taxes　strategy　for　contromng　extema1ities，say，water
pol1ution，has　a　strong　apPeal　to　economists　and　policy　makers　as　a
practica1pl＝oposal　of　the　third　alternative“tax　polluters　on1y”apProach．
We　assume　in　the　following　arguments　that　the　total　extemal　cost
function　is　known．In　this　case　we　cajユshow，using　Figure2presented
by　Tu岬ey［15コ，that　the　state　could　attain　tl1e　Pareto　optimuエn　le▽el
of　po11ution　control　at　the　point　F　by　imposing　on　the　extemality－
generating丘rm1a二匝e固uent　tax　which　is　equa1to　BF　per　unit　of　the
wastes　discharged．Then　a　socia1net　gain　is　maximized；it　is　repre－
sented　by　the　area　OAB．In　other　words，the　P孤eto　optimal　point　B
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A
Marginal　eXter皿al　COSt
to　firm2
］Margilla1　1〕enefit
to　firm1
O　　　　　　　F
　　　　　　　　Fi餌e2
Discharges　of　wastes　by　fir㎜1
is　achieved　under　competitiOn迂a　unit　tax　equal　tO　the（Pa二「et00Ptimal）
margina1damage　were　imposed　on丘rm1which　emits　the　wastes　into
the　watercourse．ω
　　The　optimaI　leve1of　polIution　contro1could　be　attained　even　if　the
state　does　not　know　the㎜aエーgina1beneit　fmction．The　state　wou1d
establ1sh　an　e岨uent　chaエge　equa1to　the　maエg1nal　externa1cost　for　each
㎜it　of　the　wastes　discharged　as　a　form　of　rent　for　the　use　of　water
to　dispose　of　them．Dischargers　wou1d　decrease　their　residuals刑ows
as1ong　as　the　marginal　cost　of　doing　so（i．e．，the　m虹gina1bene丘t1ost）
was1ess　than　the　cha］＝ge，settiing　at　the　opti皿um　where　the　marginal
bene丘t　equa1s　the　e舳ent　tax　equiv釦ent　to　the　mrginal　extema1
cost．An　e箭cient　al1ocation　of　abatement　e丘ort　wi11result　here　by
1ett虹g　each　discharger　equate　his　margin創cost　to　theco㎜㎜on　ch虹ge．
　　The　practical　adv刎tages　of　the　e舶uent　taxes　strategy　a］＝e　as　fo1lows：
First，since　the　cha二rges　wou1d　be1evied　on　the　basis　of　the　quantity
（4〕　Fol＝Inore　elaborate　aj＝9uments　o口this　工nethod　of　pol1ut量on　contro1，　refer
　to　the　chapter5in　［6コ　alユd　the　chapter29in　Musgrave－Musgrave　［12］、
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of　the　wastes　d1scharged，there　wou1d　be　a　d1rect1ncentwe　for　polluters
to　reduce　their　waste　production　h　order　to　e1iminate　a　major　pa1市of
the　charge．Second，it　wi11create　a　powerfu1a二nd　continuing　incentiYe
to　contro1po1lution　and　provides　a　positi▽e　incentive　for　research　and
deマe1opment　of　new　techniques　of　residua1sエnanagement．Th止d，the
e価uent　taxes　strategy　wou1d　asslgn　respons1bi11ty　for　pollut1on　contro1
to　those　who肛e　responsible　for　the　I〕onution、㈲
Y．　Sh0111d　Po皿11ters　Om1y　be　Taxed？
　　It　would　be　quite　c1ear　from　our　pre▽ious　discussions　that　the　e租uent
taxes　strategy　is’in　principIe　based　on　the　Pigouvia皿tax　poIicy　prescrip－
tion（t孤thoseresponsibleforextema1diseconomies）．When㎝e舳ent
tax　is　determined　in　such　a　way　as　to　equal　to　the㎜砒ginal　extema1
cost　at　the　opthna1leYe1，the　aヱguments　of　Pigouvian　taxes　on　e価ciency
wou－d　be　app1ied　to　the　c鵬e　of　e舐uent　taxes　without…㎜y　modi丘cation．
This　suggests　that　we皿ust　inquire　so㎜ewhat　in　detai1s　the伽a1舛ica1
problems　of　Pigouvi…㎜techniques．Before　going　into　the　det証1s，howeYer，
it　shou1d　be　mentioned　here　that　the　Pigouvian　po1icy　supposes　that
the　decisioI1m出ers　have　accurate　information　on　extemal　costs　and
beneits．Thus，並these　infomation　weτe　not　avai1able，tben　the　pricing
a工1d　standa工ds　apProach　discussed　in　the　section　III　エロay　do　the　trick．
　　Theマalidity　of　Pigou∀i㎝policy　prescriptions　has1ately　been　proposed
in　a　general　framework（e．g、，Bau㎜o1［1］，I皿ai－Uzawa－Komiya－Negishi一
（5）　These　asserEions　on　the　advantages　of　the　ef日uent　taxes　strategy　are
　expressed，for　example，in　the　U．S．0o”g”幽躰．o伽1灰θoo〃，Nov．25．1969，VoL
　115，No，195．
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Murakami　［8］，Negishi　［13コ），　as　counter－a二rguments　to　the　Ya工ious
cr1t1c1sms　agamst　them（e　g，Coase［5コ，Buchalnan－Stubb1ebme［3］）．
The　consequences　deriYed　from　these　general　analyses　are　that　Pig－
ouvian　proposals　a二re　generally　those　req1ユired　for　an　optimaユ　al1ocation
of　resources；neither　taxes　o皿those　who　bene丘t　from　the　reduced
po11ution　leve1s皿or　compensation　to　those　who　are　damaged　by　po11ution
are　compatib1e　with　an　optimal　resource　al1ocation．
（a）　To　show　the　point　of　arguments　we　sha11irst　construct　an
e1ementa］＝y　general　equi1ibrium　mode1．㈹For　simplicity　we　assu皿e　that
there　is　on1y　one　scarce　factor，labor，　and　that　the　externaユity　on1y
a甜ects　the　production　of　nearby　irms，1＝ather　than　causing　disutility　for
consumers．Let伽be　the　outputs　of趾m尾（尾；1，2，3，4），島be　the
total　supP1y　of　the　labor　resource　availab1e，ツ切　be　the　qua皿tity　of〃
used　by五rm居（ゴ＝1，2，3，4；ゴ≠冶），ツ碗be　the　quantity　of1abor　used　by
丘rm居，物be　the　quantity　of〃cons㎜〕ed　by　individua〕（｛＝1，…、吻），
and柵be　the　quantity　of1abor　used　by　individuaユ｛（which　is　assumed
to　be　leisure）、Here　the　input　ofツ3by缶m1is　supposed　to　impose
extemal　costs　on　the　production　of五rm2．
　　Pareto　optimaIity　then　requires　the　maximization　of　the　uti1ity　of
any　a工bitrarily　chosen　individua1，say，1，subject　to　gi▽en　any　utility
1eYels　of　the刎＿1other　indiマidua1s，a皿d　the　equaユity　between　demand
and　supp1y　of　the　outputs　and　the　factor，and　the　production　functions
（6）　The　setting　of　t］〕e　mode1s　assu血ed　in［1コand［8コseems　to　be1〕asica11y
　identical　which　may　orient　to　the　situation　exa㎜ined　fully　in　the　Coase’s
　se皿ina1paper［5］．We　here　use［8コon1y　by　extending　the2individuals　to
　the　ge口eral〃i皿divid1』als，but　there　is　l＝1o　alteration　in　the　conclusions．
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of　the危ms　Thus，the　prob1e㎜1s　to　maxm皿e〃1（”11，伽。伽μ此勿5）
subjectto伽（物，伽，κ砲，狗。，狗。）；あ（仁2，…，〃）㎝d
　　　”11＋κ21＋‘．．十κ帆1　　　　■←ツ肌十ツ31＋ツ41昌ツ1
　　　勿2＋κ22＋…十”刎十ツ12　　＋ツ32＋ツ42＝ツ2
（1）勿。十伽十…十伽十ツ1。十ツ。3　＋ツ・3ヨツ3
　　　仙十伽十…十κ刎十ツ1。十ツ2・十ツ彗・　昌ツ4
　　　幼5＋狛5＋…十κ腕5＋ツ15＋ツ25＋ツ35＋ツ45＝狛
加dツユ；五（伽，伽，ツ。。，ツ。。，），ツ，昌カ（地，伽，ツ。・。ツ蜥ツ・・）。ツ・＝瓜ツ・1・伽
ツ。。，ツ舳），ツ。：五（y。。，ツ。。，ツ。魯，ツ・・）・
　　Then，1etting力1，あ，力畠，ク4…㎜dヵ5be　the　Lagrange　mu1tipliers　for　the
constraints（1），we　obtain　the　fol1owing　optimality　conditions．
For　consumers，
　　　　脇・＝伽≡脇・＝伽＝吻・　　（1＝1，，刎）
　　　　力、　ク。　ク。　カ。　カ5
where物…∂物／∂物．These　conditions　are　satisied　by　the　behavior　of
cons皿mers　mder　competition並加is　the　price　of　the　outputゴ．
For趾ms2，3，㎝d4，
　　　伽＝伽ん　　（冶＝2，3，4；プ＝1，2，3，4；尾≠ゴ）
where瓜＝榊∂伽．Whenφゴis　the　price　of　the　output五these　condi－
tions　show　that　the　value　of　the　m孤ginal　products　ofツゴused　by　firm
后is　equal　to　the　price　of　the　productゴ．　Thus　they　are　also　satis丘ed
mder　competition．
For趾m1，
　　　加＝Aん；ク。＝ク。ん
力r磯一カ・ん
where弘ノ∂ワ13くO　by　assm1ption．The　last　condition　for　Pareto　opti・
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mm　me㎝s　that　the　opt㎞a1price　ofツ3for　the　extem釦ity－generating
丘rm1is　eq1ユa1to　the　price　ofツヨP1us　the　∀a1ue　of　margina1externa1
damage　on丘m2generated　by　irm1’s　use　ofツ君．So　this　is　satisied　by
imposi㎎on丘rm1for　the　use　ofツ3a　mit　t奴equ訓to　the　m町ginaI
externa1costs　at　the　Pareto　opt虹na1leYe1．
　　In　sum，a㎜it　t脳，say，in　the　form　of　an　e囲uent　t甑，1evied　only
on　the　extemal1ty．generatmg　act1v1ty1s　prec1se1y　what1s　needed　for
an　optimaユresouエ’ce　a11ocation．Either　compensation　to丘rm2for　the
damage　it　s雌ers　or　taxes　o皿that丘rm　for　the　bene丘t　from　the　reduced
activity　of　丘rm1　is　not　necessary，just　as　the　Pigouvian　tradition
requires．Moreover，we　observe　that　since　on1y　margina1conditions
are　re1eva］＝it，here　a　tax　on　an　increase　of　the1eve1of　an　externa1ity－
generating　acti▽ity　is　to　be　understood　equivaユent　to　a　subsidy　to　a
reduction　of　the1e7e1of　the　same　acti∀ity，the　only　d岨erence　resu1ting
iI1income　distribution．
（b）We　add　to　the　consequences　deri∀ed　above　that　it　can　be　a1so
shown　that　a　Pigouvian　tax　policy工eads　to　a　long・rm　optimum　in
reso岨ce　a11ocation，applying　a　p雄tia1equi1ibrium　model　of　two　industries
with…m　extema1ity…md　free　entry　and　exit．ω　Suppose　that　the　output
of　industry2adverse1y　affects　the　production　of　e▽ery丘rm　in　industry
1h　a1ike㎜anner．Assume』so　in　industry1and2that　there趾e
π1andπ21dent1ca1丘rms，each　produc1ng　outputツユandツ2，respect1ve1y．
We　c㎝write　inverse　dem狐d　functions　for　industry1and2as　P1（物
ツ1）and　P望（物ツ2）where　Pエ’（〃1ツ1）〈0alnd鳥’（〃望ツ2）〈0．The　total　pro－
duction　cost　for　each趾m　in　industry1is　described　as　C1⑰1）十D1（物
　　（7）This　p流heavily　re－ies　on　the　model　deマeloped　in　Schu1ze－D’Arge［14コ．
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ツ2），where　C101）is　the　direct　production　cost　and　D1（物ツ2）is　the
externaユcost　iInposed　on　each丘r工n　as　the　resu1t　of　the　emissions　of
hdustry2．The　tot創cost　for　each趾m　in　industry2is　given　by
C2Cレ2）．　It　is　assuoled　that　C1’，C2’，01”，C2”＞O　and刀1’，D1”＞O．
　　The　co皿出tions　for　a　socia1optim1■m　are　deri∀ed　fro㎜the　maximization
of　net　bene丘ts：
蝸一1；洲ハ（・・）必・・／；2フ2・・（・・）地
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　一［勿。（0。（ツ。）十D。（勿〃。））十π毘C里（ツ。）コ，
where5i　a二皿d　s2aエーe　v班iab1es　for　integration．
Then　we　obtain，
　　　∂！v1云／∂ツ1；〃1（P1－C1’）＝o
　　　∂1v1葦／∂ツ2＝焔2（P2－C2’一％1D11）＝o
　　　∂1V13／∂〃1＝」Piツ1一（C1＋1）1）＝o＝π1＊
　　　∂」vB／∂物＝P2ツ2一（c2＋吻D11ツ2）≡0≡π2＊，
w11ereπ1＊…mdπ2＊are　the1ong－run　opt1mum　levels　of　pro丘ts　for　the
丘rm　in　industry1and2，respectiYe1y，
　　When　m砒gina1extemal　costs　to　industry1，勉11）1’，are　inte卯reted
as醐optima1Pigouvian　t弧1eYied　on　the　extemality－generating　output，
ツ2，it　is　easi1y　understood　that　the五rst　two　short－rm　conditions　for
optima1ity　肛e　satis五ed　under　competition－　The　1ast　two　long－rm
optimum　conditions　suggest　that　po11uted　irms　in　industry1　bea］＝the
fu11cost　of　the　externality　D1at　the　optimum　and　that　coInpensation
for　damages　will　distor仁1ong－run　equi1ibrium；mol＝eove】＝，Po11uting丘rms
in　industry2must　bear　an　additional　cost　of221D1l　per　unit　of　outPut
狛produced．These　conditions　a二re，in　fact，equivalent　to　those　obtained
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from　the　previous　genera1equi1ibrium　modeI．　Therefore，the　s…me
proposition　on　the　Pigouviaエ1tax　po1icy　stated　above　also　app1ies　to　the
工ong－run　equ111bnum．
YI．　Shou1d　Q11a1ity－Emjoyers　A1so　be　T弧ed？
　　Now　we　shal1proceed　to　the　fourth　strategy　for　controlling　exter．
naIities：estab1ishment　of　both　taxes　on　po11uters　and　aIso　t概es　on
those　who　beneft　from　the　reduced　po11ution1eve1s　that　would　resu1t．
　　The　previous　analyses　of　Pigouvian　po1icy　prescriptions　te11us　that
“tax　po11uters　o皿工y”wou1d　be　genera1ly　an　appropriate　way　for　op－
timality．0ne　analytical　ch雄acteristic　of　the　Pigouvi㎝tradition　is
that　the“direct　interaction　apProach”of　externalities　is　adopted　in　its
analysis；that　is，it　rega二rds　externalities　as　invo1ving　the　direct　inter－
action　of　economic　units　within　a　legal　fra㎜ework　that　does　not
compel　compensation　for　damages．But　it　has　been　asserted　that　the
framework　of　the　direct　interaction　approach　is　not　necessari1y　adequate
for　dealing　with　the　enYiro皿mental　pol1ution　problems　which　usua11y
invoIve　a　number　of　poI1uters　and　po1lutees，a皿d　that　this　approach
c㎝not　make　c工ear　how　exterエ■a1diseconomies　have　brought　about，and
tl1at　the　Pigou∀ia皿policy　is　not　a1ways　an　optimal　procedure　for　Ieading
society　to　an　optimum　s並uation　by　correcting　ine伍ciency　due　to　the
existence　of　externalities．　Therefore，in　order　to　appraise　fu11y　the
third　aI1d　fourth　strategies　for　po11ution　control，we　sh釦1need　to
introduce　explicitly　into　our訂馴ments　an　altemative　apProach　to　the
Pigouvian　procedure，ca1led　the“asset　utilization　apProach”．
　　The　asset　utilization　approach　emphasizes　that　behhd　the　extemalities
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prob1em　there　ex1st　common1y　he1d　en▽mn㎜entaユassets　whlch趾e
used　simu1ta皿eous1y　by　m；my　activities　at　zero　price　and孤e　not　subject
to　a二ny　restrictions　on　entry　or　use．　The　quaIity　of　enYironmental
assets　receiYed　by　each　indiYidual　depends　on　how　much　other　activities
use　these鴉sets　a皿d　on　the　supp1y　or　attributes　of　the　assets　that　may
be　a1tered　by　the　au血ority’s　investment　on　them．Here　extema1dis－
economies　arise　as　a　deterioration　in　the　quality　of　services　when　the
tota1use　of　the　assets　exceed　considerab1y　some　Ya1ue．Among　others，
Haveman　［7］distinguishes　po1lution　from　conjestion　in　the　sense　that
the　pouution　prob1em　occurs　where　the　costs　of　reduction　in　the　quaユity
of　the　asset　are　typica11y　borne　by　a　quite　di伍erent　set　of　users　of
envirOnmental　services　than　residua1dischargers．
　　For　the　present　purpose，it　wou1d　seem　most　adequate　to　show　the
M1ohring－Boyd’s　a二rguments　that　the　va1idity　of　the　PigouYia二n　tax　policy
depends　on　the1ocational　mobi1ity　of　qua1ity　enjoyers　and　that　a　social
optimum　wi11be　attained　by　both　a　Pigouvia皿tax　and　a　franchise　tax
on　each　quality・enjoyer　for　the　use　of　the　site．⑧
（a）Fiエst　of　all，we　sha11consider　the　problem　of　optimizing　the　use
of　a1ake　which　pr0Yides　both　waste　re㎜ova1serマices　to　the〃ifms
1ocated　around　it　a皿d　a1so　water　quality　used　in　the　production　process
of　these丘rms．Suppose　that　the　production　of五rm6’s　output（γ｛）
depends　on　the　quantity　of　input｛（X｛），the　amount　of　waste　material
（8）Accordi口g　to　Mohdng－Boyd［11コ，Pol1ution　al＝ises　in　the　case　where　there
　are　mo蛇tha皿two　seエvices　fendefed　by　the　asset：e．g．，the　lake　and　dYer
　se耐e　both　as　a　repository　for　wastes　and　also　as　the　so一ユrce　of　water．For
　the　followi皿g　analysis，see［11］and　Kudo－Yabushita［1O］・K岨us・Mohring［9コ
　　ls　alsO　usefu11n　unde＝standlng　the　lssues　concerned
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which　it　emits　into　the　lake（Z｛），and　the　quaユity　of　the　water　obtained
fro皿the1a1ke（Q奇）．The　qua1ity　of　the　water　enjoyed　by　each　irm
decreases　with　increases　in　the　amount　of　wastes　discharged　by　the
パms　anωso　depends　on　attributes　of　the　iake（Z）．Let　C（ム）be
the　annua1cost　of　a1tering1a二ke　attributes，P｛and　豚｛be　the　prices　of
output　o　and　mput｛．Then　a　soc1a1goa1w111be　to　maxm1ze　the　pro趾s
for　the刎irms　which　utiIize　the1ake：
　　　max．ΣP・γ・（X｛，Z・，ρ・）一Σ豚必一C（Z）十Σ21［ρrρ・（Z1，…，Z冗，Z）］．
　　　　　　　　　｛　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　｛　　　　　　　　　　　　　　‘
After　d岨erentiationεmd　e1imination　of〃s，we　obtain　the丘rst・order
conditions：
　　　　　∂γ｛
（・）P・∂X、一肌＝O（4＝1・’’’・・）
（2）
（??
磯・孕磯饗一・（1一・パ・1・）
畔総一α一・
where∂Qjノ∂Z奄くO　and　the　other　p孤tia1deriYatiYes　aエーe　al1positiYe．
　　C1e鉦y　the　conditions（1）are　satisied　by　proft　maximization　under
competition．The　conditions（3）state　that　lake　attributes　should　be
improved　to　the　point　where　the　margina1cost　of　doing　so　equa1s　the
m砒gina1gain　from　higher　water　qua1ity．
　　The　second　conditions（2）te11us　that　the　va1ue　of　the　margina1
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　∂γ｛
P・・d・・t・fth・w・・t・d・・pM・・岬…t・丘・叫Pl∂Z也・・h・・ldb…t
equaユto　the　reduction　in　the　value　of　the　outPuts　of　al1　丘rms　that
results　from　the　deter1orat1on血water　qua11ty　to　wh1ch缶㎜o，s　d1scharge
・f・・1l・伍・・・・・・・・・・…亨磯磐・・・・・・…i・i・・・…1・・・・…ト
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・・M・・㎞…㎜…㎞・…虹・…一亨磯饗・・m・・・・・…
discha1rge　disposed　by　it．Therefore，an　optim創policy　for　this　case　is
a　Pigouvi㎝pr㏄edure　which　requires　each耐m　to　pay　t躯es　per　mit
of也e　wastes　discharged　equaユto　the　soc1al　mrgma1costs1t　mposes．
It　is　unnecess肛y　to　charge　on　the　use　of　water　quaユity．
（b）Howe∀er，we　mustエlote　that　the　above　conc1usions　resu1t　from
our　exp1icit　assumption　that　the　l㏄ation　of　each　fm　is丘xed　or　that
the　qua1ity　of　water　enjoyed　by　im1does　not　change　with　the　Iocationa1
choices．If砒e1ocationa1choices　were　possib1e，a　PigouviaI1solution
would　no　longer　be　optimalεmd　it　wou蛆become　necess班y　to1eW
taxes　not　on1y　on　pol1uters　but　also　quality　enjoyers　for　attaining　a
socia1optimum．Putting　it　d雌erently，if　the1ocation　or　other　decisions
of　quaユity　enjoyers　afEect　the　a工nount　of　the　good　produced，　then
cllarges　for　water　qua1ity孤e　necess孤y　for　e岱cient　resource釦Iocation．
　　To　demonstrate　this　asse竹ion，we　shaユ1next　consider　the　case　where
the弼丘rms　are1ocated　along　a　river　and　the　quality　of　water　provided
to　i㎜妻1s　mdependent　of　the　wastes　d1sposed　by丘ms　downstream
of1t　工mw　denotes　rlver　ch虹actenstlcs．Then　the　optmal　conditions
（1）and（3）caエ1be　inte叩reted　in　essentiaユly血e　same　way　as　before．
・・・・・・・・・・…（・）・・・…磯・、皇、磯饗一・・・・…i・1・W・㎎
㎜・価・・・…孤・・…m…一、皇、磯1髪・・・・…m・・・・・・…
it　disposes　would　estab1ish　the　ab0Ye　conditions．
　　Now　suppose　that丘ηm〃十1has　decided　to　undertake　a　riYer－oriented
activity　which　generates　no　water－bome　wastes　a＝nd　is　choosing　between
siteλ，the　most　upstream1ocation，and　siteβ，the　most　downstream
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1ocation．Letπ多a皿dπ会。1be比e　pro丘ts　of　the〃丘rms　as　a　who1e‘㎜d
£rm〃十1，respective1y，when丘m〃十1chooses　siteλ，and　a1so1et
π奈a二ndπ麦、1be　the　pr〇五ts　of　the〃fir㎜s　as　a　who1e　aエ1d　irmπ十1，
respective1y，when　fm％十1chooses　site3．If　a　qua1ity－enjoying肚m
勿十1choosessiteλ，thennochangesinthebehavior　of丘rms1，…，〃wou1d
・・ω1・…己…“m・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・…岬冊・・1蒙：1∂霧十工
has　to　be　paid　additio皿al1y　by　the勿趾ms　as　a　who1e　and　hence　each
ir岨whose　wastes…雌ect　water　qua1ity　at　site3wou1d　be　required　to
reduce　its　activity．
　　So，in　order　that　the1ocational　choice　of　irm〃十1on　site　B　is　a
s㏄ia1opti㎜um，the　tota1pro趾s　then　must　exceed　those　rea1ized　when
丘rm％十1chooses　site■4，i．e．，π葦十π葦十1＞π多十・π差十1，orπ葦十i一π差十1＞π多一π穿．
Therefore，a　sociaユoptima1ity　requires　that　a　franchise　tax　equal　to
π多＿π葦shou1d　be　imposed　on　a　qua1ity　enjoyer，frm〃十1，for　the　use
ofsite五．AgeneralpropositioncmbederivedfromthiscoI1c1usion．
The　estab1ishment　or　expansion　of　a　qua1ity－enjoying　activity　may
1＝educe　the　sociaIly　optima1levels　of　activities　that　degrade　the　quality
attributes　of　enYironmenta1assets　in　question．E命ciency　wouId　require
this　fact　to　be　taken　into　accomt．One　way　of　doing　so　would　be　to
impose　a　franchise　tax　on　each　quaユity－enjoying　activity　equaユ　to　the
hcrease　in　the　net　soci釦product　of　po11uting　activities　that　would
reSu1t並it　Went　Out　Of　eXiStenCe．
We止ave　seen　that　an　optmaユpoHcy　for　control1mg　extema肚1es
has　to　be　altered　when　the　locational　choices　a工e　possiblel　Since　a皿
eleInent　of　the1ocat1on　ls皿nportant　m　most　of　the　po1工utlon　proble工ns，
we　wiI1not　be　a11owed　to　talk　about　optma1－ty　w1thout　taking　de1iberate
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considerations　of　the　hnpacts　rendered　by　the　1ocationa1choices。
YII．Co皿c111d㎞g　Remarks
　　There　remain　the　prob1ems　of　stability　a皿d　multip1e　loω㎜虹ma
which　have　been　exp1icit1y　treated　in　recent1iteratures．Bearing　these
prob1ems　in　our　mind，we　sha11brie週y　restate　our　pre∀ious　conc1usions
h　sections　V…㎜d　VI　a皿d　add　some　consequences　derived　from　Baumo1
［1コand　Kra1ユs－Mohring［9コ。
　　It　wou1d　be　said　that　the　uniqueness　and　stabi1ity　of　the　equi1ibrium
1s　mp11cit1y　assumed　m　the　case　of　Pigouv1an　tax　po11cy．In　th1s　case，
the　i皿position　of　suitab1e　taxes　in　po11uters　on1y　would　su蘭ce　to
achieve　a　social　optimum．This　ho1ds　regard1ess　of　whether　taxes　are
imposed　at　socia11y　optimu蛆rates　from　the　start　or　at　rates　which
re血ect　current　daエnage1eve1s　that孤e　sequentia11y　adjusted．In　a　world
of　muItip1e1oca1optima，howeマer，taxing　po11uters　oI11y　cou1d　not　be
relied　on　to　achieve　a　g1ob釦optimm1．　Po11uter　t狐es　coup1ed　w砒
po1lutee　taxes　wou1d　assure　this　if　re1ocation　is　e筋cient　socia11y．But
neither　sequentia11y　adjusted　po11uter　taxes　aユone　nor　such　taxes　accom・
pa皿ied　with　sequentia11y　adjusted　franchise　taxes　on　po11utees　cou1d　be
used　for　a　g1obaユoptimum．
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